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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

RicardoJ. Bascuas*
ABSTRACT

In 2013, the Supreme Court tacitly conceded that the
expectations-of-privacy test used since 1967 to assess
claims of Fourth Amendment violations was inadequate.It
asserted that the previous property-based test for Fourth
Amendment violations had never despite widespread
agreement to the contrary been overruled. The Court
compounded its artfulness by applying a new, significantly
weaker trespass test that, like the expectations-of-privacy
test, enjoys no legal pedigree. This new trespass test, which
is to be applied together with the expectations-of-privacy
test, suffers from the same defect as the test it purportedly
supplements. It does not require the government to respect
private property rights absent probable cause. Part I
describes Olmstead v. United States, an early missed

opportunity to have created a pragmatic Fourth
Amendment trespass test that set the stage for the
unpredictable and unprincipledjurisprudence that Justice
Brandeis' ill-conceived dissent later inspired. Part II
explains how the expectations-of-privacy test that
originatedwith Katz v. United States in 1967 allowed the
Court to put sensitive records and communications as well
as contrabandbeyond the FourthAmendment's scope. Katz
also helped turn the ever-growing number of pervasive
corporationsagainst their customers and into surveillance
agents for the government. Part III demonstrates how
Katz's superfluous and sweeping pronouncements about
privacy expectations added no significant constitutional

*
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protection that the trespass test it supplanted did not
already afford. Instead,it enabled the erosion of significant
rights that had existed. Jones consciously perpetuatesthese
flaws, affording courts no help in adjudicating Fourth
Amendment claims involving new technology. Part IV
shows that, in federal fraud cases, the Court identifies
property interests using a pragmatic,flexible, common-law
approach consistent with the pre-Katz trespass test. It
argues that this same analysis could be applied to Fourth
Amendment claims, resolving the problems that the
expectations-of-privacyapproachhas generated.
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In

October

2009,

Sprint

Nextel's

manager

of electronic

surveillance spoke at a conference in Washington, D.C., for
telecommunications company employees and law enforcement and
intelligence agents.1 He boasted that the cellular telephone carrier had
created an automated system for law enforcement officers to easily learn

1 Christopher Soghoian, DEA Rejects FOIA for 38 Pages ofDocs Related to
Sprint's Digital SurveillanceAPI, SLIGHT PARANOIA (March 23, 2011),

http://paranoia.dubfire.net/20 11/03/dea-rejects-foia-for-3 8-pages-of-docs.html.
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the location of any Sprint Nextel customer.2 Federal agents accessed the
automated tracking system eight million times between September 2008
and October 2009 without oversight or demonstration of good cause.3 Paul
Taylor, the Sprint Nextel manager, boasted about the Drug Enforcement
Agency's use of the company's state-of-the-art interface:
We have a pilot program with them,
subpoena generation system in-house
actually sit down and enter case data,
the head guy at the office, and then

where they have a
where their agents
it gets approved by
from there, it gets

electronically sent to Sprint, and we get it ... So, the DEA

is using this, they're sending a lot and the turn-around time
is 12-24 hours. So we see a lot of uses there.
Privacy researcher and blogger Christopher Soghoian, who was in
attendance, posted recordings of the panel discussion on the Internet.5 The
blog post drew attention to Soghoian's ongoing efforts to ascertain the
scope of government surveillance conducted with corporate help. 6 Two
days later, TeleStrategies, the company hosting the "Intelligence Support
Systems for Lawful Interception, Criminal Investigation and Intelligence
Gathering" conference, forced Soghoian to remove the videos, claiming
copyright infringement.7 Sprint Nextel disingenuously said via Twitter
that Taylor's unabridged comments were "taken out of context."

2

d.

3

Id.

'Id. (alteration in original).
Christopher Soghoian, 8 Million Reasons for Real Surveillance Oversight,
(Dec. 1, 2009), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2009 12 01 archive.html.
6 Jon Stokes, SprintFed Customer GPS Data to Cops over 8 Million
Times, ARS
TECHNICA (Dec. 1, 2009, 6:38 PM), http://arstechnica.com/telecom/news/2009/12/sprintfed-customer-gps-data-to-leos-over-8-million-times.ars.
Soghoian, supra note 5.
Rich Pesce, SharingLocation Information, SPRINT COMMUNITY (Dec. 1, 2009,
3:30 PM),
http://community.sprint.com/baw/community/sprintblogs/announcements/blog/2009/12/0
1/sharing-location-information.
5

SLIGHT PARANOIA
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In his blog post publicizing Sprint Nextel's disclosure, Soghoian
pointed out that Sprint Nextel is not the only company handing over
customer data to the government: "These Internet/telecommunications
firms all have special departments, many open 24 hours per day, whose
staff do nothing but respond to legal requests. Their entire purpose is to
facilitate the disclosure of their customers' records to law enforcement and
intelligence agencies . . . ."9 The information routinely disclosed includes

"the telephone numbers dialed, text messages, emails and instant messages
sent, web pages browsed, the queries submitted to search engines, and
geolocation data, detailing exactly where an individual was located at a
particular date and time."10 The scale on which this type of surveillance
occurs is unknown.
Soghoian had long been working to learn how much government
surveillance is conducted through telecommunications companies. Before
the 2009 ISS World conference, he theorized that knowing the rates these
companies charge the government for each surveillance request-they do
not do this for free-would help him estimate the frequency of requests.
Soghoian made Freedom of Information Act requests to federal law
enforcement agencies to learn the prices carriers charged them for
customer data." Carriers objected, claiming that all information related to
their disclosures to law enforcement agencies is secret.12 After the
conference, Soghoian specifically requested information regarding the
DEA's use of Sprint Nextel's system; the DEA declined to produce any
113
information.

Even small, local police departments now routinely obtain location
information, text messages, and other data from cellular carriers.1
9 Soghoian,
10

supra note 5.

1d.

11Christopher Soghoian, FOIA Returns 91 Invoicesfor Yahoo Surveillance, 1
for Google, SLIGHT PARANOIA (Jan. 18, 2010), http://paranoia.dubfire.net/2010/01/foiaretums-91-invoices-for-yahoo.html; Soghoian, supra note 5.
12 Soghoian, supra note
5.
13 Soghoian, supra note 1.
Eric Lichtblau, PoliceAre Using Phone Tracking as a Routine Tool, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 1, 2012, at Al.
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Providers of Internet, email, cloud-storage, and "social-networking"
services also provide information.1 5 Companies and government agencies
seek to minimize the attention paid to this practice undoubtedly because of
the Orwellian flavor to the idea that the corporations responsible for
everyone's personal communications and files are government clients.
One police department, for example, instructed officers not to discuss
cellular tracking publicly and not to mention it in police reports. 16 But
neither do agencies and corporations conceal their information trade,
which is, from the point of view of big government and big business, just
the natural result of the way things are. The corporations have
information, the government can subpoena it, and the corporations have
no choice but to turn it over. It's that way in China,17 and it's that way in
the United States of America.
For more than 80 years, the Supreme Court has fretted over the
surveillance capabilities the information age has provided the federal,
state, and local governments. Listening devices,18 recording equipment,19
tracking devices, 20 surveillance aircraft,21 thermal imagers 2 2 urinalysis, 23
15 See,

e.g., TransparencyReport, GOOGLE,

http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ userdatarequests/US/?p=2011-12 (last visited

Apr. 20, 2013).
16 Lichtblau, supra note 14.
17See Ricardo J. Bascuas, Propertyand ProbableCause: The
Fourth
Amendment's PrincipledProtectionofPrivacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REv. 575, 575-80 (2008)
(describing Congressional hearings over an email service provider's giving a political
dissident's emails to the Chinese government, which then imprisoned the dissident).
18 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality opinion) (holding that
conversations with bugged informant were not protected by the Fourth Amendment);
Silvermanv. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (holding use of "spike mike"
unconstitutional and describing parabolic microphone).
19 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (holding that recording of
undercover agent's conversation with defendant did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
20 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276 (1983).
21 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraollo, 476 U.S. 207
(1986).
22 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
23 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002);
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
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and hemanalysis 24 have had justices fretting over the Fourth Amendment's
ability to protect private life from technological encroachment. In 1928,
Justice Brandies forebodingly warned: "Ways may some day be developed
by which the Government, without removing papers from secret drawers,
can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to expose to
a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home., 25 Nearly 40 years later,
Justice Douglas feared the situation had grown dire: "We are rapidly
entering the age of no privacy, where everyone is open to surveillance at
all times; where there are no secrets from government." 2 6 "The law,
though jealous of individual privacy, has not kept pace with these
advances in scientific knowledge," concluded Justice Clark a year later.2 7
Consternation over tomorrow's surveillance technology has been
the constant feature of an otherwise haphazard Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. The Court tried proceeding incrementally, as in 1961's
Silverman v. United States, when Justice Stewart's majority reached a
narrow holding rather than attempting one that would curtail the use of
parabolic microphones "and other frightening paraphernalia which the
vaunted marvels of an electronic age may visit upon human society."2 8
Forty years later, another majority took the opposite tack. Alarmed that Xray vision "is a clear, and scientifically feasible, goal of law enforcement
research and development," Justice Scalia's opinion in Kyllo v. United
States sought to craft a future-proof holding: "While the technology used
in the present case was relatively crude, the rule we adopt must take
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in
development." 29
532 U.S. 67 (2001); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat'l
Treasury Emps. Unionv. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
24 Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966).
25 Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
26 Osbornv. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1966)
(Douglas, J., dissenting
in two cases and concurring in one); see also Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 778-79 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
27 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 49 (1967).
28 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
509 (1961).
29 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
35 & n.3 (2001).
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The Court has vacillated not only over the breadth of its holdings
but also over the substance of what the Fourth Amendment prohibits.
Until 1967, the Court evaluated Fourth Amendment claims using property
law concepts, reasoning that the amendment prohibited government from
trespassing property without good reason. So, in 1928's Olmstead v.
United States, the Court upheld wiretaps of telephone lines used by the
defendants but physically located outside their homes and offices. 30 The
intercepted conversations, being neither papers nor effects, could not be
seized, reasoned the Court. 31 After years of intermittent progress toward
repudiating Olmstead's faulty reasoning, the Court abandoned the
property framework in 1967, holding in Katz v. United States that the
Fourth Amendment protects an implicit right to privacy.3 2 This created a
great many problems and solved none.
Forty-five years after Katz, a bare majority of the Court implicitly
conceded what had for decades been obvious: that the Katz test often
sanctions intrusions that the Fourth Amendment ought, by its plain terms,
to condemn. The Court unanimously concluded in United States v. Jones
that police officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they attached a
tracking device to a Jeep parked in a public lot-but divided over why.3 3
Four justices believed GPS tracking infringed on "expectations of
privacy" 34 while the majority invoked the pre-Katz property framework,35
claiming that "the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been
added to, not substitutedfor, the common-law trespassory test." 36 If this

30

Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.

31

Id.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 259 (1967).
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
1 d. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring).
35 This is not the first time Justice Scalia has channeled Chief Justice Taft in a
Fourth Amendment case. In Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), Justice Scalia
applied the same methodology that Chief Justice Taft used for determining whether a
search was unreasonable in Carrollv. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). See Ricardo J.
Bascuas, FourthAmendment Lessons from the Highway and the Subway: A Principled
Approach to Suspicionless Searches, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 719, 739-41 (2007).
36 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
32

33 United
34
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were true, it would mean that the Court had been lying for years.37 Nearly
every justice to sit on the Court since Katz including every justice on the
Jones Court (except the recently confirmed Justice Elena Kagan)-had
until Jones said that Katz overruled Olmstead-and not by elaborating on
its approach but by supplanting the property framework with one based
only on an ill-defined notion of privacy.38 An earlier majority opinion,
37 None of the cases on which Jones relied to support its re-characterization of
Katz lent support. On the contrary, these cases went to great pains to explain why the
Katz formulation alone sufficed to determine whether a search occurred and pretended
that the Katz test invariably offers broader Fourth Amendment protection than the
trespass test it supplanted. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), gave a
property owner standing to object to the admission of conversations other people had in
his premises not on the basis of a trespass theory, but on the theory (coincidentally also
espoused by Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Kyllo v. United States) that everything
inside a home is private. The Court held that, whether there is a trespass or not,

"officialdom invades an area in which the homeowner has the right to expect privacy for

himself, his family, and his invitees, and the right to object to the use against him of the
fruits of that invasion, not because the rights of others have been violated, but because his
own were." Id. at 179 n.11. Oliver v. UnitedStates predicated its holding not on "open
fields" being outside of the Fourth Amendment's scope, but on their not being private:
"The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations
of privacy are legitimate." 466 U.S. 170 (1984). United States v. Soldal involved a
seizure, not a search, and consequently it was enough that the mobile-home owners had
been unlawfully dispossessed of their property: "[S]eizures of property are subject to
Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the
Amendment has taken place." 506 U.S. 58, 68 (1992).
38 See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010)
(opinion of the
Court by Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., & Stevens, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer,
Alito & Sotomayor, JJ.) (citing Olmsteadas being overruled by Katz); United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280 (1983) (opinion of the Court by Rehnquist, C.J., joined by
Burger, White, Marshall, Powell & O'Connor, JJ.) (noting that in Katz, "the Court
overruled Olmstead saying that the Fourth Amendment's reach 'cannot turn upon the
presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure"'); United States v.
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 559 (1982) (opinion of the Court by Blackmun, J., joined by
Brennan, Marshall, Powell & Stevens, JJ.) (citing Katz as overruling Olmstead); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (opinion of the Court by Rehnquist, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., & Stewart, Blackmun & Powell, JJ.); (stating that Katz "repudiate[ed] the
doctrine derived from" Olmstead and Goldman); Kaiser v. New York, 394 U.S. 280, 282
(1969) (opinion of the Court by Stewart, J., joined by Warren, C.J., & Brennan, White &
Marshall, JJ.) ("[Olmstead], then, stated the controlling interpretation of the Fourth
Amendment with respect to wiretapping until it was overruled by [Katz]."); Desist v.
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also penned by Justice Scalia, outright said that the Court had "decoupled
violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory
violation of his property . . . ."39 Katz itself hinted as much when it held
that Olmstead's underpinnings "have been so eroded by our subsequent
decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling."4 0 Until Jones, Katz's overruling of Olmsteadwas

United States, 394 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1969) (opinion of the Court by Stewart, J., joined
by Warren, C.J., & Brennan, White & Marshall, JJ.) ("Our holding [in Katz] that
[Goldman] and [Olmstead] 'can no longer be regarded as controlling' recognized that
those decisions had not been overruled until that day.") (citation omitted); see also
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 920 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Alito, J.) (citing Olmstead as being overruled by Katz); Harper v.
Va. Dep't of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 109 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same); Florida v.
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 459 n.3 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.) ("And
of course [Katz], which overruled Olmstead, made plain that the question whether or not
the disputed evidence had been procured by means of a trespass was irrelevant.");
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 51 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by
Marshall, J.) ("The Court properly rejects the State's attempt to distinguish trash searches
from other searches on the theory that trash is abandoned and therefore not entitled to an
expectation of privacy."); California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987) (White, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Powell, J.)
(assuming that petitioner retained ownership of garbage and stating, "Rooney's property
interest, however, does not settle the matter for Fourth Amendment purposes, for the
reach of the Fourth Amendment is not determined by state property law"); United States
v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 138 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.)
("Fortunately, we know from precedents such as [Katz], overruling the 'trespass' doctrine
of [Goldman] and [Olmstead], that this Court ultimately stands ready to prevent this
Orwellian world from coming to pass."); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 547 n.5
(1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart & Marshal, JJ.) (citing Katz as having
"explicitly" overruled Olmstead); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653-54
(1971) (plurality opinion by White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Stewart & Blackmun,
JJ.) ("[Katz] overruled [Olmstead] and [Goldman] and gave expanded Fourth
Amendment protection against nonconsensual eavesdropping."); United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 748-49 (1971) (plurality opinion by White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., &
Stewart & Blackmun, JJ.) (recognizing that the Court in Katz overruled Goldman and
Olmstead); id. at 780 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Katz] added no new dimension to the law.
At most it was a formal dispatch of [Olmstead] and the notion that such problems may
usefully be resolved in the light of trespass doctrine .... ).
3 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143).
4 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
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such a foregone certainty that the most influential legal style manual used
Olmsteadto illustrate how to cite an overruled case. 41
Katz declared "expectations of privacy" to be the concept at the
core of the Fourth Amendment, disregarding its language as well as the
trespass standard. With Katz, the Court licensed itself to withdraw the
Fourth Amendment's protection from virtually all modem records and
communications and from contraband-two types of property that the
Fourth Amendment was most certainly meant to protect. In the process,
the Court turned corporate service providers against their customers and
conscripted them into service as government spies. 42 Given that
relationships with giant corporations penetrate even the most intimate
aspects of modem life, the expectations-of-privacy framework has
ironically proven deeply inimical to individual privacy.
Despite its pretentions, Jones does not redress Katz's flaws so
much as mimic them. Jones creates a new trespass test, just as malleable
as Katz's expectations-of-privacy approach. The test combines a narrow,
recently contrived definition of "seizure" with narrow, colonial-era
notions of houses, papers, and effects. Jones thus repudiates the idea,
embodied in the Court's pre-Katz holdings, that technological innovation
yields new forms of property entitled to full Fourth Amendment
protection. By 1967, the Court had made significant progress toward a
pragmatic, flexible understanding of "papers" and "effects"-one
adaptable to technological change-repudiating Olnstead's two key
premises. It ruled that the amendment protected against trespasses in a
broad rather than a legalistic sense and that conversations, despite being
intangible, were protected "papers" or "effects". The Court's post-Katz
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including Jones, has disregarded that
pragmatic, principled understanding of a Fourth Amendment violation.
But the property notions underlying it have endured. Outside of the Fourth
Amendment context, the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have
"THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 10.7.1(c)(i), at 102
(Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010).
42 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 773 (1964)
("Today it is the combined power of government and the corporations that presses against
the individual.").
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shown that they have relatively little difficulty identifying new forms of
property in a changing world. Because the Fourth Amendment expressly
protects property, it can do the work it was designed to do only if it is
understood as protecting property in all its forms against unjustified
intrusion.
I.

KATZ'S FLAWED FOUNDATION

In 1927, when a wired telephone was cutting-edge
communications technology, AT&T and the other phone companies of the
day sided with their customers against the government in a case testing the
scope of the Fourth Amendment. The text's guarantee of the people's right
"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects" was understood
as a right to exclusive dominion over their property (and their bodies).43
The case, Olmstead v. United States, asked whether this protection
extended to the telephone conversations of a large-scale Seattle
bootlegging operation.
It was the dawn of the information age, a time when AT&T was
completing its consolidation of regional telephone carriers into the Bell
System, with the audacious aim of linking the entire world. "Indeed, the
phrase used to describe the era that the Bell scientists helped create, the
age of information, suggested we had left the material world behind. A
new commodity-weightless, invisible, fleet as light itself-defined the
times."44 Ethereal though it might be, from the telephone companies'
standpoint, that commodity-information-was no less property because
it was not recorded on paper. They urged the Court to recognize that

43 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment's underlying principles "apply to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of
the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal
liberty, and private property .... ).
" JON GERTNER, THE IDEA FACTORY 11 (2012).
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telephone calls were, like letters sent through the mail, protected by the
Fourth Amendment from unauthorized tapping by federal agents:
When the lines of two "parties" are connected at the central
office, they are intended to be devoted to the exclusive use,
and in that sense to be turned over to the exclusive
possession, of the parties. A third person who taps the lines
violates the property rights of both persons then using the
telephone, and of the telephone company as well.
While "deplor[ing] the use of their facilities in furtherance of any criminal
or wrongful enterprise," the phone companies maintained that "it is better
that a few criminals escape than that the privacies of life of all the people
be exposed to the agents of the Government, who will act at their own
discretion, the honest and the dishonest, unauthorized and unrestrained by
the courts." 46
Judge Frank Rudkin, who was on the Ninth Circuit panel that
considered the case, likewise envisioned a Fourth Amendment
encompassing new forms of property created by technology. (The phone
companies' brief and one of the petitioners' briefs quoted his dissent.4 7 )
Judge Rudkin relied on Exparte Jackson,4 8 a landmark nineteenth-century
case holding that the Fourth Amendment protected mailed letters and
packages from inspection. If people's thoughts were in the telephonic age
to be carried by wires rather than papers, he reasoned, the word "papers"
in the Fourth Amendment was capacious enough to embrace those
messages:
[I]t is the contents of the letter, not the mere paper, that is
thus protected. What is the distinction between a message
sent by letter and a message sent by telegraph or by
Brief for Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co. et al. as Amici Curiae at 4, Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (No. 493) (citing Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S.
215 (1918)).
1

46

Id. at 9.

7

Id. at 7; Brief of Petitioners Edward H. McInnis, Charles S. Green, Emory A.
Kern, Z.J. Hendrick, Edward Erickson, William P. Smith at 11-12, Olmstead v. United
States, Green v. United States, McInnis v. United States (Feb. 6, 1927).
1

4

96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877).
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telephone? True, the one is visible, the other invisible; the
one is tangible, the other intangible; the one is sealed, and
the other unsealed; but these are distinctions without a
difference. A person using the telegraph or telephone is not
broadcasting to the world. His conversation is sealed from
the public as completely as the nature of the
instrumentalities employed will permit, and no federal
officer or federal agent has a right to take his message from
the wires, in order that it may be used against him.4 9
This pragmatic view of information constituting property drew
support from the Supreme Court's 1918 decision in InternationalNews
Service v. Associated Press.5 0 The Associated Press sought to enjoin
International News Service from republishing news that AP reporters had
gathered and published.5 1 As Justice Holmes noted, the telegraph and
telephone made it possible for the INS to republish AP-generated news
very shortly after-and, on the west coast, sometimes before-AP
published it. 52 The Court undertook to decide whether information
gathered by a news company's reporters constitutes property and, if so,
whether that news loses its character as property once it is published.53
Rather than trying to determine whether news would have technically
constituted property at common law, the Court used a functional approach
to sustain its jurisdiction over the cause. Applying this same pragmatic
view of property to the merits, the Court had little trouble concluding that

49 Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1927) (Rudkin, J.,
dissenting), aff'd, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
5
o Brief for Pac. Tel., supra note 45, at 4 (citing Int'l News Serv., 248 U.S. 215).
5' 248 U.S. at 231.
52 Id. at 247 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
53 Id. at 232 (majority opinion).
5
1Id. at 236-37 ("In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the
controversy, we need not affirm any general and absolute property in the news as such.
The rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of property rights
treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right and the right to acquire
property by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled to
protection as the right to guard property already acquired." (citations omitted)).
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the news gathered by AP reporters was the company's property because it
took effort to acquire and was marketable:
Not only do the acquisition and transmission of news
require elaborate organization and a large expenditure of
money, skill, and effort; not only has it an exchange value
to the gatherer, dependent chiefly upon its novelty and
freshness, the regularity of the service, its reputed
reliability and thoroughness, and its adaptability to the
public needs; but also, as is evident, the news has an
exchange value to one who can misappropriate it.55
The Court rejected the idea that news ceased to be property for these
purposes upon publication: "The peculiar value of news is in the spreading
of it while it is fresh; and it is evident that a valuable property interest in
the news, as news, cannot be maintained by keeping it secret." 56
Ten years later, however, the Court was far more rigid in
evaluating the Bell Companies' contention that a telephone conversation
similarly constituted property. Chief Justice William Howard Taft's
opinion for the Court in Olmstead framed the issue as whether the Fourth
Amendment could be violated by a wiretap effected "without trespass
upon any property of the defendants." 57 The majority held that the case did
not implicate the Fourth Amendment for two reasons. First, the
conversations themselves, being intangible, were not papers or effects and
could not be seized. 8 Second, because the wiretaps were made without
entering the defendants' houses or offices, there was no trespass of any
property.59

55

Id. at 238.

56

Id at 235.

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 455-57 (1928).
5

1Id. at 466.

59

Id. ("Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions
brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a

defendant unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his
house 'or curtilage' for the purpose of making a seizure.").
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contention that the Court should give "papers" and "effects" a more
flexible definition and treat telephone conversations the same way as
mailed correspondence: "The contracts between telephone companies and
users contemplate the private use of the facilities employed in the service.
The communications belong to the parties between whom they pass." 60
In a dissent regrettably destined to be more influential, Justice
Louis Brandeis availed himself of some of the more colorful flourishes
from the phone companies' brief. (For example, the brief stated: "[T]he
telephone system offers a means of espionage compared to which general
warrants and writs of assistance were the puniest instruments of tyranny
and oppression."61 Justice Brandeis' opinion: "As a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of
tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping." 62 ) But Justice
Brandeis' argument swept far more broadly and metaphysically than the
Bell System's. It grandiloquently trumpeted that the Framers of the Fourth
Amendment intended to protect not mere property but the thoughts and
feelings comprising every individual personality:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be
let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every
unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy
of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.6 3
60 Id. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting).
61 Brief for Pac. Tel., supra note 45,

at 7-8.
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
63 Id. at 478.
62
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This was a quite romantic view of history. It was not the Founders
but Louis Brandeis himself and his law partner, Samuel Warren, who
sought legal recognition of "man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of
his intellect," in their 1890 Harvard Law Review article, The Right to
Privacy.6 4 That article suggested how tort law might develop to deal with
invasions of privacy committed not by the government but by a
sensational press eager to meet the timeless demand for scandal. In 1890,
"instantaneous photographs" made possible "the unauthorized circulation
of portraits of private persons" while newspapers freely publicized
people's words and acts.6 5 The article lamented the proliferation of
photography and yellow journalism, precursors to today's costless
propagation of compromising images, videos, and other information on
the Internet. Brandeis and Warren complained that the newspapers'
profiteering from vice and banalities muffled civic discourse:
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the
vicious, but has become a trade, which is pursued with
industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient taste the
details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily papers. ... When personal gossip

attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space available
for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder
that the ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative
importance.66
The article has a lot to say about whether being "tagged" in an
embarrassing photograph on Facebook should give rise to a cause of
action 67 but nothing at all to do with government surveillance or the
Fourth Amendment.
64 Samuel

Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.

193, 193 (1890).
65
66

Id. at 195.
Id. at 196.

67 See, e.g., Christopher Danzig, No, You Can't Sue Your Unclefor Putting
EmbarrassingFamily Photos on Facebook, ABOvE THE LAW (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/no-you-cant-sue-your-uncle-for-putting-embarrassingfamily-photos-on-facebook/#more-136286.
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Despite its immateriality to constitutional interpretation, Justice
Brandeis' conception of a right to privacy gained traction in Fourth
Amendment adjudication. 68 Concern that technology made spying
possible without a trespass led some justices to call for abandoning the
trespass test in favor of a privacy inquiry.69 In 1967, Katz v. United
States70 cemented the notion that the Fourth Amendment protects the right
to privacy with its holding that a warrantless government wiretap of a
telephone booth used for illegal bookmaking was unconstitutional. That
there was no trespass on the defendant's property was irrelevant.7 1 Rather,
what mattered was that, given "the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communication," a person was entitled to expect
"that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the
world."72 Katz thus emphasized its purpose of more readily bringing
modern forms of communication within the Fourth Amendment's scope.
The Court's definition of "privacy" was sourced to Brandeis and Warren's
The Right to Privacy.73

68 See,

e.g., Wardenv. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299, 303, 305-06 (1967) ("We
have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of
privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural

barriers rested on property concepts."); id. at 310-11 (Fortas, J., concurring); Davis v.
United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (stating that the Fourth Amendment protects "the
privacy of the individual, his right to be let alone"); see also Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("With this decision the Court has completed,
I hope, its rewriting of the Fourth Amendment, which started only recently when the
Court began referring incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against
unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual's privacy.").
69 See, e.g., Osbornv. United States, 385
U.S. 323, 342-43 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in two cases and concurring in one) ("[T]here begins to emerge a society quite
unlike any we have seen-a society in which government may intrude into the secret
regions of man's life at will."); Silvermanv. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 513 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring) ("[O]ur sole concern should be whether the privacy of the home
was invaded."); Goldmanv. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 138-40 (1942) (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) ("Physical entry may be wholly irrelevant.").
70 389 U.S. 347.
71
d. at 359.
72

Id. at 352.

73

See id. at 350 n.6 (citing Warren & Brandeis, supra note 64).

The FourthAmendment in the InformationAge

2013]

498

Katz was an infelicitous vindication of Justice Brandeis' wideranging Olmstead dissent. Justice Stewart's majority opinion set out not
merely to overrule Olmstead but to broaden the scope of the Fourth
Amendment by rendering its text illustrative rather than binding. As vague
as it was ambitious, the opinion offered courts no practical help in giving
effect to this new "right to privacy." 74 So, they turned to Justice John
Harlan's concurrence. The test for deciding whether the Fourth
Amendment applied to an official intrusion became whether the
government disappointed a "reasonable expectation of privacy."7 5 A
privacy expectation is "reasonable" if the judiciary decides that "society is
prepared to recognize [it] as 'reasonable.' 76 The Supreme Court later
adopted this circular inquiry as law, committing judges to a jurisprudence
lacking a well-articulated core concept and necessarily requiring
guesswork about what Americans think about privacy claims. Justice
Black's dissent in Katz rightly lambasted the Court for "referring
incessantly to the Fourth Amendment not so much as a law against
unreasonable searches and seizures as one to protect an individual's
privacy.
But he incorrectly predicted that the reimagined amendment
would be the Court's "vehicle for holding all laws violative of the
Constitution which offend the Court's broadest concept of privacy."7 9
Katz shared its theoretical underpinnings with Griswold v.
Connecticut," which invalidated a law criminalizing the use of
contraceptives during spousal relations on the basis of a constitutional

7 See Peter Winn, Katz and the Originsof the "ReasonableExpectation of
Privacy" Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REv. 1, 6 (2009).
7 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Kyllo v.
United

States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984);

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 (1979).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32-34 (discussing Katz test); Minnesota v. Carter, 525
U.S. 83, 97-98 (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing Katz test as "self-indulgent" and
lacking any "plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment").
7 Katz, 389 U.S. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
79
d.
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
76
7
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right to marital privacy." These two cases are products of the mid-century
belief that a right to privacy must be implied in the Bill of Rights to serve
as a bulwark against government spying and oppression. 82 They describe a
single "right to privacy" emanating from several constitutional
provisions.8 3
Not surprisingly, then, the critique that Professor Henry Monaghan
leveled at Griswold applies equally to Katz.8 4 Instead of interpreting the
Fourth Amendment's words to account for new ways of doing old
things-as the Bell Companies suggested in 1927-Katz posits that an
individual's property rights must yield whenever a court decides the
government's interest in trespassing is more important. For judges to find
the Fourth Amendment's meaning not "in its history or in judicial
precedent, but in current social consensus"8 5 of what ought to be private is
as illegitimate as it is unworkable. With the text no longer constraining
interpretation, the inherent "difficulty of relating ancient norms to a world
radically different from that of the Framers" leaves courts to resolve
search-and-seizure challenges by "balancing the interests at stake, with the
constitutional guarantees assessed in functional, rather than historical,
terms." 86
The Court's notion that the law could protect abstract privacy
directly was a doomed exercise in "perfectionist"8 7 or "noninterpretivist""
constitutional interpretation with little connection to the Fourth
Amendment's wording. This is neither surprising nor accidental. "[I]n a
society that chiefly values material well-being, the power to control a
particular portion of that well-being is the very foundation of
" Id. at 485.
82 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 445 (1976) ("Indeed,
the privacy
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment is quintessentially personal.") (discussing Katz and
citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold, 381 U.S. 479).
83 Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 484.
5

1
86
1

7

Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981).
Id. at 355.

Id. at 393.
Id. at 358.
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1 (1980).
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individuality." 89 Justice Harlan's formulation of Katz instead tied the
Fourth Amendment's scope to the judiciary's best guess as to what most
Americans consider private. For judges insulated by constitutional design
from popular sentiment, gauging America's privacy expectations is an
impossible task.90
II. KATZ'S CURTAILMENT OF PRIVACY

Rather than broadening the amendment's protection, Katz teed up
a narrowing of its scope when the Burger Court adopted a more
parsimonious view of privacy than the Warren Court had envisioned.
Despite the Jones majority's unsupported claim that "Katz did not narrow
the Fourth Amendment's scope," 91 Katz diluted the rights of those who are
not, in one way or another, like a typical judge-the young, the poor, the
uneducated, the technologically savvy, and the nonconforming. 92It
proved, however, steadfastly solicitous of privacy concerns with which
judges could immediately identify. 9 3 For example, although the justices
could not agree on a majority rationale, the Supreme Court unanimously
held that government employees have a constitutional expectation of
privacy in their government offices. 94
It took just a few years for an insular and out-of-touch judiciary
operating with a cabined understanding of privacy to remove two core
Reich, supra note 42 at 733, 774.
Monaghan, supra note 84, at 386 ("[Courts] are the least capable of divining
what is acceptable to the populace.").
91 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012).
92 See Bascuas, supra note 17, at 630 & n.322; see
also United States v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 257 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States v. PinedaMoreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc).
93 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (describing Katz test as
circular, subjective, and unpredictable); Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring)
(same); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97-98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same).
94 O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (plurality opinion); id. at 731
(Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 737 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89
90
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categories of "papers and effects" from the Fourth Amendment's
protection. First, the records corporations maintain on behalf of their
customers were held to be not private on the theory that customers
voluntarily disclose that information to corporations to obtain services.
Second, whether someone possessed contraband, the Court concluded,
was not worthy of constitutional protection because, on balance, society's
interest in getting that information outweighed any individual's interest in
withholding it. Katz distorts Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by
penalizing the sharing of information and by balancing the perceived
desirability of enforcing a right against that of enforcing a criminal statute.
A. K4TZ' S FAILURE TO PROTECT "PAPERS"
Just as the Associated Press decision recognized that "a valuable
property interest in the news . . . cannot be maintained by keeping it

secret," 95 the Warren Court understood privacy to include not only a right
to keep information secret but also a right to control its dissemination. As
Justice Brennan recognized in a pre-Katz opinion: "The right of privacy
would mean little if it were limited to a person's solitary thoughts, and so
fostered secretiveness. It must embrace a concept of the liberty of one's
communications, and historically it has."96 But, because the Katz notion of
"privacy" was not rooted in the Constitution's text, future decisions could
limit the Fourth Amendment's scope by adopting a narrower view of
privacy.
Less than a decade after Katz, the Burger Court defined what is
constitutionally "private" as that which is secret-rather than that which is
not public. 97 In United States v. Miller,9 8 the Court held that a bank
customer, by revealing his transactions "to a third party" (i.e., the bank),
Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918).
96 Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 449 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97 Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection." (emphasis added)).
98 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
95
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risked that the government might subpoena the information.99 The Court
reasoned that a depositor conducting business with his bank takes the
same risk as a criminal who mistakenly confides in an undercover agent or
informant.100 Three years later, Smith v. Marylandheld that the numbers
people dial on their telephones are not private because people must realize
that the carriers can record, and hence reveal, that information. 101
Californiav. Greenwoodl02 extended this notion even further. In that case,
the Supreme Court held that police can search and seize garbage put out
for collection without probable cause or a warrant, reasoning that, because
it is "common knowledge" that raccoons, children, and reporters
sometimes get into garbage, people cannot expect police not to search
it.103

By equating "privacy" with "secrecy" and banks with government
informants, the Court helped make all corporations, willing or unwilling,
de facto government agents, transforming the relationship among
individuals, the government, and corporations in America.io4 In an earlier
age, correspondence and sensitive records were protected as "papers"
typically kept in "houses."10 5 Building on that history, the telephone
companies in 1927 saw it in their interest to argue that their customers
owned their telephone conversations. But, after Miller and Smith,
corporations no longer had that option. Corporate records, despite being
not public, were not private and, hence, were thrown open to the
99

Id. at 442-43.
"o Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (plurality
opinion) (holding that conversations with a bugged informant were not protected by
Fourth Amendment); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) (holding that use of an
informant to infiltrate a suspect's inner sanctum did not violate Fourth Amendment);
Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) (holding that an undercover agent's entering
a suspect's home to purchase marijuana did not violate the Fourth Amendment)).
101 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979).
102 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
103

Id. at 40-41.

104See Charles A. Reich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1429-30
(1991) (arguing that the distinction between the government and corporations has been
eviscerated).
105Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

503

VirginiaJournalof CriminalLaw

[Vol. 1:3

government. This transformation was part of a broader alignment of power
between government and large corporations based on the "conviction that
private power was a chief enemy of society and of individual liberty.
Property was subjected to 'reasonable' limitations in the interests of

society." 106
Communications companies today generally do not question the
government's right to buy customers' personal information with public
funds. The carriers sell their services to the public and then quietly receive
government payments to divulge the sensitive information those services
generate. The permeation of every aspect of life by mammoth corporations
promising ever more efficient and convenient ways of archiving,
processing, and transmitting information means that, if only what is secret
is private, then not much of any significance is private.
Equating privacy with secrecy convolutes Fourth Amendment
analysis by requiring judges to make factual findings about how
Americans understand new technology to work as well as about how new
technology actually does work. If communicating or storing information
entails conveying it to someone else, then the Fourth Amendment may not
apply.10 7 The analysis is all the more difficult because it is predicated on
the near contradiction that telephone conversations are private (as Katz
evidently held), but information shared with entities like banks and
telephone companies is not (as Miller and Smith said). Because
"expectations of privacy" are too difficult to discern objectively, the postKatz Fourth Amendment's application to new ways of communication and
storing information is always uncertain and unpredictable. 1os

Reich, supra note 42, at 773.
107 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 (9th Cir. 2008)
(following Smith v. Maryland and holding that the names of people with whom one
corresponds by email as well as the addresses of the websites one visits are not private
because users "should know that this information is provided to and used by Internet
service providers for the specific purpose of directing the routing of information").
108 Cf Reich, supra note 104, at 1445 ("It is quite useless, for example, to repeat
in case after case the formula-little better than an incantation-about an 'expectation of
privacy."').
106
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The Supreme Court itself is hopelessly confused. The Court threw
up its hands in 2010 and confessed that it had no idea how to apply its
own Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to text messages. 109 City of Ontario
v. Quon raised the issue of whether the Fourth Amendment protected text
messages sent by a municipal police sergeant with a two-way pager issued
by his department.no Seeking to determine whether the officer was
sending too many personal messages while on duty, the police department
got transcripts of his messages from the carrier. Nearly all of the messages
turned out to be personal, and many of them were sexually explicit. The
sergeant was disciplined, and he audaciously sued the city for violating his
"right to privacy.""' Even with the briefs of both parties and ten amici
curiae, the Court said that it could not discern societal expectations of

privacy in text messages.112
In its apologia (from which Justice Scalia disassociated himself1 13),
the Court frankly admitted that, with respect to anything other than ageold ways of transacting business and communicating, it can predict neither
subjective privacy expectations nor "the degree to which society will be
prepared to recognize those expectations as reasonable." 1 14 Instead of
deciding the case, the Court assumed arguendo that text messages enjoy
constitutional protection.1 15 The Court then sidestepped another issue that
the Katz test had failed to resolve (for more than 20 years) by further
assuming that the department's action, obtaining and reading its
109 See, e.g., City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2625 (2010) (comparing
how text messages and emails are transmitted).
110 Id.

111 Id. at 2626 (the officer's main text-message correspondents-his estranged
wife, his girlfriend, and a fellow sergeant-were also plaintiffs).
112 Id. at 2629.
113 Id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("To whom do we owe an additional
explanation for declining to decide an issue, once we have explained that it makes no
difference?"); id. ("The Court's implication that where electronic privacy is concerned
we should decide less than we otherwise would . . .- or that we should hedge our bets by
concocting case-specific standards or issuing opaque opinions-is in my view
indefensible. The-times-they-are-a-changin' is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.").
11'Id. at 2630 (majority opinion).
115
id.
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employee's text messages, was a search. 116 And, finally, the Court
assumed that government employees have the same expectation of privacy
in electronic messages as they do in the things they keep in their offices.117
Having thus ignored all the technological aspects of the case, the Court
decided the search was constitutional because the police department had a
"noninvestigatory work-related purpose" for reading the texts. 18
Evincing no appreciation of the irony, the Court explained that the
expectations-of-privacy inquiry-the one that promised to make the
Fourth Amendment flexible enough to deal with technological changenecessitated moving slowly: "The judiciary risks error by elaborating too
fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology
before its role in society has become clear." 119 How a text-messaging
pager was an "emerging technology" in 2010-three years after Steve
Jobs unveiled the first iPhone-went unexplained. More revealing was the
citation used to illustrate the sort of error the judiciary risked by
"elaborating too fully" on legal questions: The Court cited Katz's
overruling of Olmstead. In other words, the Quon Court suggested that
Olmstead was decided incorrectly because the Court moved precipitously
in 1928-when the telephone had been in widespread use for about 35
120
years.
116

Id. In O'Connorv. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court could not agree
on a methodology for deciding whether a government employee can expect privacy in his
office. The case generated no majority opinion. Later decisions skirted the issue, and the
Quon Court passed on it as well: "In the two decades since O'Connor,... the threshold
test for determining the scope of an employee's Fourth Amendment rights has not been
clarified further.

. .

. The case can be decided by determining that the search was

reasonable even assuming Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy." Quon, 130 S.
Ct. at 2628-29.
117 Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
...
Id. at 2631 (quoting O'Connor,480 U.S. at 726 (plurality opinion)). The
Court avoided having to decide whether the officer's co-respondents had a Fourth
Amendment claim because they failed to claim their own privacy was unconstitutionally
violated. Id. at 2633.
119
Id. at 2629 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967)).
12 0
A BriefHistory: Origins, AT&T,
http://www.corp.att.com/histoiy/histoiyl.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2013).
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For a court to assume but not decide that a right exists is not a
harmless ploy; it insulates government illegalities, even deliberate ones,
from redress. A month after the Quon debacle, the Eleventh Circuit
considered a suit against a Georgia district attorney and chief investigator
who, as a favor to the management of a local hospital, conspired to falsely
charge a troublesome hospital employee with various crimes. 121 In the
course of their malicious prosecution, the prosecutor and the investigator
subpoenaed the employee's phone records and emails from his
communications carriers. 122 Relying on Miller and Smith, the court in
Rehberg v. Paulk had no trouble concluding that "Rehberg lacked a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the phone and fax numbers he

dialed." 123
Whether the illegal demand for the emails that Rehberg sent and
received offended the Fourth Amendment was, the court believed, a close
question.124 Even while criticizing Quon for its "marked lack of clarity in
what privacy expectations as to content of electronic communications are
reasonable," 125 the appellate court refused to decide whether the emails
were constitutionally protected. If the Supreme Court was unable "to
answer the constitutional question of whether the plaintiffs privacy
expectation was reasonable or even to set forth the governing principles to
answer that question," then the court of appeals would not try.126 Instead,
the court held that, even if the Constitution were violated, the prosecutor
and his investigator were entitled to immunity.127 Bizarrely, the court
faulted the plaintiff for failing to show that "his alleged constitutional
right"-the one that courts only hypothetically assume exists-"was
clearly established." 128 Keeping rights hypothetical means that police and
121 Rehberg

v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828 (11th Cir. 2010), aff'd on other grounds, 132

S. Ct. 1497 (2012).
122 Id. at
842.
123

Id. at 843.

124 Id.
125

Id. at 844.
at 845, 846.
127
Id. at 846.
128
Id. at 846.
126Id.
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prosecutors enjoy immunity for even the flagrant abuses of power
perpetrated on Rehberg.
A few months later, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Katz
discourages courts from acknowledging and enforcing rights and observed
that the problem is an intractable aspect of Katz's atextual interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Warshak, the court refused to
assume a Fourth Amendment violation just for the sake of argument
before deciding that the aggrieved was not entitled to any remedy. 129 The
court recognized that judicial shirking of Fourth Amendment questions
gives the government "carte blanche to violate constitutionally protected
privacy rights." 130 It also recognized that email had achieved a "prominent
role" and, indeed, that "an explosion of Internet-based communication has
taken place." 13 1 Reasoning that emails had become as prevalent as letters
and telephone calls, the court relied on Ex parte Jackson's protection of
the mailsl 32 and Katz's protection of the wires to conclude that emails
stored by an Internet carrier are constitutionally protected. 133 The court
distinguished Miller on the ground that the bank in Miller was not an
intermediary but the intended recipient of the records seized. 134
Because it was forced to build on the Katz framework, Warshak
perpetuated the idea that messages cease to be private once they reach the
intended recipient, from whom they can be seized. Worse, despite its
pretense to progressivism, the decision reaffirmed the notion that
legitimate expectations of privacy coalesce only once a practice is so
pervasive as to be utterly mainstream. So, just as Katz anachronistically
intimated that the telephone had only recently come into widespread use
and Quon called two-way pagers an "emerging technology" in 2010,
Warshak described email that same year as though it were new.
Conditioning the constitutional status of a private message on who
happens to have possession of it when the government intercepts it and
129
130

Warshak, 631 F.3d at 292.
Id. at 282 n.13.

13 1

Id. at 284.

132

ExparteJackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
F.3d at 284.

133 Warshak, 631
134

Id. at 288.
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how popular the medium used to create it has become produces an
arbitrary and needlessly complex jurisprudence.
If the Fourth Amendment applies only to ways of keeping and
communicating information that Supreme Court justices consider
prevalent, all indications are that it will stay perpetually obsolete.
Speaking to a group of bankruptcy judges in late 2011, Justice Elena
Kagan said that the justices "ignore 25 years of technology" and "do not
email each other." 135 "The clerks e-mail each other, but the justices do
not." 136 Instead, they dispatch messengers carrying paper notes to
communicate with each other. 137 During oral argument, rather than using
the Internet to consult source materials, the justices have pages, who sit
out of sight behind the bench, fetch opinions or books.138 At conference,
each justice has, rather than a laptop or an iPad, a cart piled with "all the
briefs they need to consult during deliberations." 139
Such superannuated practices would seem quaint but innocuous if
Katz did not require judges to gauge America's privacy expectations in the
present. But, until some critical mass of the judiciary recognizes society's
adoption of a new technological norm, the expectations-of-privacy
framework wrongfully denies constitutional protection to new ways of
communicating and recording ideas. In the meantime, courts fumble about
trying to discover society's privacy expectations by drawing analogies to
the past: Emails are like letters. 140 Computers are like file cabinets. 14 1
Furthermore, Katz's failure to grapple with the realities of everyday life
Supreme CourtJustice Elena Kagan Speaks in Tampa, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Oct.
15, 2011, http://tbo.com/news/crime/supreme-court-justice-elena-kagan-speaks-in-tampa272250.
136 Id.
137 Id., see also JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIvE CHIEFS 73 (2011).
138 STEvENS, supra note 137,
at 117.
139
1d. at 213.
135

140 See,

e.g., United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 284 (6th Cir. 2010).
141See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010) ("At
bottom, we conclude that the sheer amount of information contained on a computer does
not distinguish the authorized search of the computer from an analogous search of a file
cabinet containing a large number of documents.").
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also reaches backward as courts reconsider the Fourth Amendment's
application to ancient media. Under the expectations-of-privacy
framework, a letter can cease to be private once the Post Office delivers it
to the intended recipient, even if that happens to be the writer's spouse.142
This means that the government is barred by Ex parte Jackson from
reading mail while it is in transit.143 But, the moment the message reaches
its recipient, government agents can search the recipient's house (or
computer) without cause, seize the correspondence, and use it against the
sender, who, having suffered no invasion of privacy, lacks standing to
complain. 144
B. KATZ'S FAILURE TO PROTECT "EFFECTS"
Katz put contraband as well as correspondence and records outside
the Fourth Amendment's protection. Before Katz, the Court had
repeatedly affirmed that, although the federal and state governments could
by statute extinguish the right to possess certain taboo things, like
whiskey, the Fourth Amendment nonetheless protected those things from
unreasonable search and seizure. Contraband, in other words, could be
trespassed like any property for Fourth Amendment purposes, even though
technically it could not be owned. 145 This made sense as both a matter of
United States v. King, 55 F.3d 1193, 1195-96 (6th Cir. 1995) ("In
this case,
King voluntarily mailed the letters at issue to his wife. Although he may have instructed
her to preserve the confidentiality of the letters, there is no evidence that he expected her
to return the letters to him. Under those circumstances, his expectation of privacy in the
letters terminated upon delivery of the letters to his wife."); see also United States v.
Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1321 (2nd Cir. 1994) (holding that expectation of privacy in
correspondence terminates upon delivery); Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 658
F.2d 608, 611 (8th Cir. 1981) (same).
143Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733.
1" Cf United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980) (defendant lacked Fourth
Amendment standing to move for suppression of documents that IRS agents illegally
seized from another person's briefcase and surreptitiously photocopied).
145 See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 53 (1951) (holding that Congress'
declaring cocaine to be contraband was "intended to aid in their forfeiture . . . rather than
to abolish the exclusionary rule formulated by the courts in furtherance of the high
142
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history and of law. The Fourth Amendment's protection of contraband is
at the very core of its guarantee, given that the amendment was directed at
the general warrants that the English crown had used to search for libelous
writings, whose possession was if not itself illegal at least evidence of
guilt. 146 Today, whether a person possesses something that the legislature
has banned is, according to numerous decisions, a fact not entitled to any

privacy." 7
Before 1967, contraband was treated like all other effects for
Fourth Amendment purposes, except that the government was in all events
entitled to confiscate it. In Trupiano v. United States, the Court suppressed
an illegal still, alcohol, and brewing equipment seized during a warrantless
raid on a farm because agents had surveilled the bootleggers for weeks
and could easily have obtained a warrant. The Court ruled the seizure
unconstitutional even though there was no trespass except to the
contraband itself Because the agents could see a man operating the illegal
still inside the leased barn from a place where the farm's owner allowed
them to be, they were allowed to arrest him without a warrant. 149 That,
however, did not excuse their failure to obtain a warrant to seize the
contraband. While the evidence was deemed property for Fourth
Amendment purposes, its statutory status as contraband meant that the
petitioners had "no right to have it returned to them."15 0
Just two years before Katz, the Court affirmed Trupiano's
1
protection of contraband in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania.s
purposes of the Fourth Amendment").
146 Bascuas, supra note 17, at 631; Wardenv. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 313-15
(1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
147 See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09
(2005); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
14' 334 U.S. 699, 707 (1948), overruled in part by United States v. Rabinowitz,
339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950); see also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966)

(holding that marijuana and statements obtained at defendant's home by undercover
officer were admissible because defendant voluntarily made the statements and sold the
marijuana); id. at 213 (Brennan, J., concurring).
149
15

Trupiano, 334 U.S. at 704-05.

o Id. at 710.
151 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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Relying on a statute that made vehicles carrying illegal liquor contraband,
Pennsylvania argued that a car could be searched without probable cause
because it was contraband-as established by liquor discovered in it
during a search.152 Rejecting that bootstrapping argument, the Court
reiterated that the Fourth Amendment protects contraband just like any
other property.153 The Court held that the liquor had to be suppressed from
the proceeding to forfeit the car.
After Katz, the Court could-and did-treat contraband more
cavalierly because its status as property was beside the point. Framing the
issue as whether one has a "legitimate expectation of privacy" in hidden
contraband left little doubt as to how the Court would resolve it. In United
States v. Place, the Court stated that "briefly" seizing a person's luggage
so that a dog can sniff it for drugs does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment because "the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item" and "does not expose noncontraband items
that otherwise would remain hidden from public view."
Because Katz
fails to accord due deference to property rights, the opinion fails to
acknowledge a person's right to stubbornly-even irrationally-refuse to
hand over one's suitcase for even an instant absent probable cause. Place
thus holds that the privacy-based Fourth Amendment subordinates
property rights to the courts' view of the communal good. 155
The following year, the Court heard UnitedStates v. Jacobsen,156a
case in which Federal Express employees reported a package containing
cocaine to the Drug Enforcement Agency. Justice John Paul Stevens'
majority opinion held that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the
inspection of the package or to the field test for cocaine because neither
infringed a privacy expectation. The opening of the package did not
infringe privacy because "the Federal Express employees had just
examined the package and had, of their own accord, invited the federal

15 2
15 3

Id. at 694 & n.3.
Id. at 699.

462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
See Reich, supra note 42 at 774.
156 466 U.S. 109
(1984).
154
155
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agent to their offices for the express purpose of viewing its contents."s5
Relying on Place, the Court further held that the seizure of the package's
contents was reasonable because "it is well-settled that it is
constitutionally reasonable for law enforcement officials to seize 'effects'
that cannot support a justifiable expectation of privacy without a warrant,
based on probable cause to believe they contain contraband."15 8
Justice Brennan complained in dissent that the Court's "new
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" was not proceeding along the lines he
had expected when the Court decided Katz.159 Brennan disagreed "with
the blanket assumption, implicit in Place and explicit in this case, that
individuals in our society have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the
fact that they have contraband in their possession. . . ... 160 He worried that
the Court's refusal to recognize a privacy interest in contraband meant that
"law enforcement officers could release a trained cocaine-sensitive dog . .
.... to roam the streets at random, alerting the officers to people carrying

cocaine."161 He was prescient on this point but did not live to see the DEA
fully realize his nightmare two decades later. 162 In Illinois v. Caballes, the
Court, again speaking through Justice Stevens, extended Place's rationale
to systematic, routine dog sniffs of cars pulled over for speeding: "We
have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed
'legitimate,' and thus, governmental conduct that only reveals the
possession of contraband 'compromises no legitimate privacy interest."'163
Comparing Trupiano to Jacobsen suggests Prohibition might have
fared better under the post-Katz Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen presented
essentially the same facts as Trupiano. In both cases, a private actor (the
farm owner in Trupiano, the Federal Express employees in Jacobsen)
called federal agents to report trafficking in prohibited substances (booze,
157

Id. at 119.
at 121-22.
159 Id. at 137 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
15
1 Id.

160 d.
161Id. at 138.
162 Bascuas, supra note 35, at 761-63 (describing DEA's Operation Pipeline).
163 543 US. 405, 409
(2005).
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cocaine). In both cases, federal agents investigated without getting a
warrant, although they surely could have. In the pre-1967 regime, the
Court divided five to four over whether the seizure was constitutional
despite the failure to get a warrant. After 1967, a majority of the Court
decided that the Fourth Amendment did not even apply to the inspection
of a private package because a third party had destroyed the aggrieved's
expectation of privacy in his belongings.
Katz's disregard of contraband is not confined to drug cases. It
means that any unpopular group can have its Fourth Amendment rights
curtailed through the enactment of possession offenses. 164 Indeed, it is not
hard to find examples of how the argument that contraband is outside the
Constitution's protection could be applied to suppress political dissent and
marginalize minority viewpoints.165 Walter v. United States,166 on which
Jacobsen relied, involved a shipment of "12 large, securely sealed
packages containing 871 boxes of 8-millimeter film depicting homosexual
activities." 167 The box was misdirected and opened by employees of a
company that was not the intended recipient. Each individual box of film
was labeled with "suggestive drawings" and "explicit descriptions of the
contents." 168 The employees alerted the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
whose agents later viewed the films without a search warrant.
No justice who had been on the Court when Katz was decided
thought the viewing of these films was constitutional-but it was Katz that

See generally Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime
and the End of CriminalLaw, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 829, 836 (2001) ("So broad
is the reach of possession offenses, and so easy are they to detect and then to prove, that
possession has replaced vagrancy as the sweep offense of choice.").
165 See, e.g., Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 407
n.3 (1960) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting from dismissal of appeal) ("The Attorney General of New Hampshire in the
motion to dismiss in this case states, 'Those who voluntarily and knowingly appear with,
consult with, confer with, attend functions with and otherwise act in concert with
Communists or former Communists in America cannot possibly have any reasonable
right of privacy in regard to such activities."').
166 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
167 Id. at 651 (plurality opinion).
164

16 8

Id. at 652.
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let four more recent appointees conclude that it was. 169 Although the
decision generated no majority opinion, six justices agreed that, under
Katz, the legality of the search depended on whether the FBI agents went
beyond what the company employees already had done. Justices Stevens
and Stewart believed that, because the employees did not view the films,
the FBI agents' viewing of them was a further invasion of privacy that
required a warrant.1 70 The four dissenters contended that the "employees
so fully ascertained the nature of the films before contacting the
authorities" that the FBI's screenings were not an "additional search
subject to the warrant requirement."1 7 1 They reasoned that, because it
"was obvious from the drawings and labels on the containers" that "the
films were of an explicit sexual nature," the "petitioners had no remaining
expectation of privacy" in the films. 172 Only Justices White and Brennan
believed that ascribing dispositive significance to whether the employees
happened to watch the films was an unsatisfactory way to determine the
scope of a constitutional right:
The notion that private searches insulate from Fourth
Amendment scrutiny subsequent governmental searches of
the same or lesser scope is inconsistent with traditional
Fourth Amendment principles. 173
Underlying Walter and Jacobsen is the idea that once private
property is trespassed, any subsequent trespass inflicts no harm (or only
trivial harm) on the owner. So, it is not wrongful. It is as though, once
property is trespassed, its owner loses the exclusivity of dominion and
control that is property's essence. Then, anyone, including government
agents, can have a look. To believe that is to believe that the Founding
Fathers would not have been offended had a messenger read seditious

Justice Marshall concurred only in the judgment in Walter and recused
himself in Katz because he had been solicitor general while the case was pending.
169

170

Id. at 654.
171 Id. at 663-64 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Walter v. United States, 592
F.2d 788, 793-94 (5th Cir. 1979)).
172

Id. at 663.

173

Id. at 660-61 (White, J., concurring in part).
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writings entrusted to him for delivery and then handed them over to agents

of the Crown.
III. KA TZ, JONES, AND THE POSTMODERN FOURTH AMENDMENT

That Katz puts personal information and contraband beyond the
Fourth Amendment's protection is all the more lamentable because the
decision made no countervailing contribution to the nation's
jurisprudence. By the time Katz was decided, the Court had already
repudiated Olmstead's holdings (reaffirmed in 1942 ) that electronic
surveillance entailing no trespass did not implicate the Fourth Amendment
and that conversations were incapable of being seized. Olmstead's
rationale having already been repudiated, Katz could have been decided
applying the more pragmatic, flexible trespass test that was Fourth
Amendment law in the 1960s.
In 1961, Silverman v. United States held that the slightest
imaginable warrantless conversion of a defendant's property-even if it
was not technically a trespass under local law-violated the Fourth
Amendment. In Silverman, police officers inserted a spike mike from a
vacant row house into the neighboring house until it hit the defendants'
heating duct, "thus converting their entire heating system into a conductor
of sound."1 7 6 The Court unanimously held that this violated the Fourth
Amendment.
Two years later, Wong Sun v. United States relied on
Silverman to conclude for the first time that conversations could, like
papers" and "effects," be the subject of a Fourth Amendment seizure.
17' Goldmanv.
175
176

United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135 (1942).
Silvermanv. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961).

Id. at 506-07.

17 Id. at 511-12 ("This Court has never held that a federal officer may without
warrant and without consent physically entrench into a man's office or home, there
secretly observe or listen, and relate at the man's subsequent trial what was seen or
heard.").
178Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) ("It follows from our
holding in [Silverman] that the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing
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Building on Silverman, Wong Sun equated oral communications with
written ones for Fourth Amendment purposes.
In the term before Katz, Berger v. UnitedStates made express what
Wong Sun and Silverman implied. It held that conversations were a
species of "papers" or "effects" within the Fourth Amendment's terms.
Berger struck down a New York statute that authorized wiretapping a
private office without a proper warrant. An indispensable premise of the
Court's rationale was that Olmstead was wrong in holding that
conversations were not capable of being seized: "Statements in the
opinion that a conversation passing over a telephone wire cannot be said
to come within the Fourth Amendment's enumeration of 'persons, houses,
papers, and effects' have been negated by our subsequent cases as
hereinafter noted." 17 9 Further in the opinion, the Court again described
conversations as a type of property. Explaining that New York's statute
did not require a warrant "particularly describing . . . the persons or things

to be seized,"18 0 the Court observed that the statute was defective for not
requiring "that the 'property' sought, the conversations, be particularly
described." 181
So, by 1967, the two premises that the Bell System and Justice
Butler had urged in Olmstead were validated. First, rather than
conditioning the Fourth Amendment's protection on the vagaries of local
property law, courts would decide whether the government, as a practical
matter, converted or trespassed property. Second, conversations could be
"seized" under the Fourth Amendment just as tangible property. This was
enough to convert the old trespass test into a highly flexible but principled
of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of 'papers and effects.'
... Thus, verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an
unauthorized arrest as the officers' action in the present case is no less the 'fruit' of
official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion.").
179 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 51 (1967).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Berger, 388 U.S. at 58-59; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 372
(1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("It is the Court's opinions in this case and Berger which
for the first time since 1791, when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, have declared
that eavesdropping is subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions and that conversation can
be 'seized."').
1so
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tool for applying the Fourth Amendment to new forms of property without
risking diminution of its traditional protection.
The outcome in Katz was thus assured by very recent precedent.
There was no need for the decision to do anything more than clarify
certain ambiguities Berger created regarding the procedures for
authorizing a wiretap and reiterate that conversations were within the
Fourth Amendment's protection of papers and effects. 182 Had the Court
refrained from broad and vague pronouncements regarding a supposed
right to privacy, judges could have set about refining the pragmatic
property approach adopted in Silverman and Berger using common-law
methods restrained by the text's solicitude for property rights. 183 This
endeavor would have yielded a more predictable and principled
jurisprudence and facilitated applying the amendment to new technology.
Instead, they spent more than four decades attempting to divine societal
expectations of privacy. Over Justice Black's pointed criticism, Katz
needlessly and heedlessly brushed aside the Fourth Amendment's text to
give the Court an unbounded jurisprudential tool for dealing with the
threat it perceived from electronic surveillance.
Katz allowed the Court to withdraw the Fourth Amendment's
protection whenever it felt that the interests of "society" outweighed an
individual's property rights-and the Court did so repeatedly.1 s4 It
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 364 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The Court's opinion in this
case ... removes the doubts about state power in this field and abates to a large extent the
confusion and near-paralyzing effect of the Berger holding."); see also Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court had feared
that bringing electronic surveillance within the Fourth Amendment's reach would
effectively outlaw its use because complying with the warrant requirement would be
impossible); Winn, supra note 74, at 2-6.
183Monaghan, supra note 84, at 394 ("One could, after all,
argue that
elaboration of the specific guarantees of the bill of rights exhibits characteristics of both
common law and statutory interpretation: common law because their content is worked
out in the manner of the analogical and precedential reasoning characteristic of the
common law courts; statutory because, so far as is practicable, emphasis has been and
still should be placed on historical setting and original intent.").
184 See Reich, supra note 42, at 761; see also, e.g., United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 703 (1983) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's scope is ascertained by
"balancing the competing interests to determine the reasonableness of the type of seizure
182
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extended no countervailing protection that the trespass test it displaced
would not have afforded. The vast majority of the Supreme Court's cases
invalidating a search would, like Jones and Katz itself, turn out the same
way under either a trespass or an expectations-of-privacy analysis.
Kyllo v. United States, decided in 2001, is one of those rare cases
to invalidate a search entailing no trespass.
It held that using a thermal
imager to measure the relative amount of heat emanating from a house
constituted a search because the Fourth Amendment shields all
information about the inside of a home "from prying government eyes." 186
Struggling to imagine what, if any, consequence a thermal imager might
reveal, Justice Scalia's majority opinion posited that it "might disclose, for
example, at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily
sauna and bath-a detail that many would consider 'intimate' ... ." The

trespass test, as Justice Stevens' dissent implied, would have led to the
conclusion that no Fourth Amendment search or seizure occurred. The
dissent explained that, while warrantless "through-the-wall" surveillance
(which entails a trespass in the Silverman sense) would violate the Fourth
Amendment, "off-the-wall" measurement of heat emanating from a house
does not.187 "[P]ublic officials should not have to avert their senses or their
equipment from detecting emissions in the public domain such as
excessive heat, traces of smoke, suspicious odors, odorless gases, airborne
particulates, or radioactive emissions, any of which could identify hazards
to the community."188
Kyllo is no justification for Katz. Its strange equating of
constitutional privacy with a Victorian sort of modesty or prudishness
allowed the Court to be magnanimous regarding the hypothetical Mrs.
Kyllo's toilet habits. But that same wordplay exposed many actual people
to more revealing searches. An earlier decision, also written by Justice
Scalia, held that high school football players could be subjected to random
involved"); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (plurality opinion).
1s5 It is arguably the only such case. Katz, as Silverman and Berger make clear,
is not one.
186 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
37 (2001).
17 Id. at 46 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
"'sId. at 45.
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urinalysis testing for drugs on the bizarre rationale that players see each
other nude: "School sports are not for the bashful. They require 'suiting
up' before each practice or event, and showering and changing afterwards.
Public school locker rooms, the usual sites for these activities, are not
notable for the privacy they afford." 189 Putting aside the fact that many
athletes are bashful, even the most uninhibited exhibitionist is entitled to
be free from suspicionless seizures and searches of his bodily fluids. The
Court made this clear in a pre-Katz case involving forced blood testing of
a man suspected of driving drunk: "Such testing procedures plainly
constitute searches of 'persons,' and depend antecedently upon seizures of
'persons,' within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment." 190 More
recently, the Court held that police can, at least in some circumstances,
strip search anyone arrested for anything, indicating that Kyllo's
protection is not very far-reaching.191 It is hard to find merit in a
jurisprudence that considers the timing of showers "intimate" information
but countenances compelling schoolchildren to urinate for their teachers
and misdemeanants to be strip searched.
1 92
Jardines v. Florida
further illustrates that neither Katz nor
Kyllo's specific application of it offers any significant analytical benefit.
That case pitted Kyllo's holding that all information about what happens
inside a home is constitutionally protected against Place's holding that
whether someone possesses illegal drugs never is. Police officers
confirmed that marijuana was being cultivated inside a home by walking a
drug-sniffing dog up to the front door. Justice Scalia's majority opinion
held that the officers unconstitutionally searched the house because "they
gathered that information by physically entering and occupying [a
constitutionally protected] area to engage in conduct not explicitly or
implicitly permitted by the homeowner." 193 The Court noted, "One virtue

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
Schmerber v. United States, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
191Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012);
see also Hudsonv. Mvichigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597 (2006) (stating that knock-and-announce
rule protects "the right not to be intruded upon in one's nightclothes").
192 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
189
190

19 3

Id. at 1414.
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of the Fourth Amendment's property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy
cases easy."194 Justice Kagan's concurrence, joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Sotomayor, reached the same conclusion using Katz's expectationsof-privacy rubric. The concurrence believed that the case was "already
resolved" by Kyllo, "suggesting that a focus on Jardines' privacy interests
would make an 'easy case easy' twice over .. 11195
"9
Jones v. United States, decided the year before Jardines,
acknowledged that Katz is a failed experiment that should never have been
allowed to escape the laboratory, but it did not repudiate its unworkable
test. All nine justices agreed on the outcome in Jones, but the majority
gratuitously purported to resuscitate what it called the "common-law
trespassory test," suggesting some fundamental dissatisfaction with
Katz. 196 Nonetheless, Justice Scalia's majority opinion agreed with the
concurrences that expectations of privacy remain important to Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. (Four justices disputed that any trespass test
survived Katz and would have relied exclusively on Katz.197 Justice Sonia
Sotomayor's separate concurrence intimated that she believed the GPS
tracking of an automobile violates both the Katz test and the trespass
test. 19)
Jones, however, actually creates a new trespass test, one that
incorporates an unduly restrictive, Katz-era definition of "seizure".
Whereas Silverman reasoned that any conversion of property is a seizure,
Justice Alito's Jones concurrence asserted, and the majority agreed, that a
seizure of property "occurs, not when there is a trespass, but 'when there
is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in
194
195

Id. at 1417.

Id. at 1419, 1420 (Kagan, J., concurring) (brackets omitted).
196 Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012). The Court attempted to
revive the trespass test once before in a unanimous decision by Justice White, then the
only remaining member of the Katz Court. See Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 62
(1992) ("[O]ur cases unmistakably hold that the Amendment protects property as well as
privacy."). Soldal had little impact. See Bascuas, supra note 35, at 736-37 & n. 110; see
also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97-98 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
197 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring).
198
Id. at 955, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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that property."' 1 99 By this, the Court apparently meant
Antoine Jones' Jeep functioned, it was not seized. The
concluded that attaching the GPS to the Jeep was an
search because "[t]he Government physically occupied
for the purpose of obtaining information. ,,200
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that, as long as
majority instead
unconstitutional
private property

The Jones Court's cabined definition of "seizure" was concocted
in 1984's United States v. Jacobsen201 and is inconsistent with the preKatz trespass test that Jones purports to apply. Under Silverman, property
is seized regardless of whether its owner's enjoyment of it is at all
impeded; any conversion of private property to the government's own use
suffices because what the owner is entitled to is exclusive use. The spike
mike used in Silverman made contact with a pipe, "usurping part of the
petitioners' house or office-a heating system which was an integral part
of the premises occupied by the petitioners ... ."202 The heating system

presumably worked just as before, a fact the Court gave no attention. Yet,
on the basis of mere contact with a pipe the Court distinguished Goldman
v. United States, 203 a 1942 case that affirmed Olmstead's trespass test in
which agents used a listening device that did not touch the target's
property.2 0 4 While the opinion might be more clear on the point,
Silverman's emphasis on the government's "usurpation" or conversion of
the heating system is more naturally characterized as a seizure of that
system than as a search of the house.2 0 5
199 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 951 n.5 (quoting id. at 958 (Alito, J., concurring)). To
carry the Coke analogy forward, this adulterating definition of seizure is the high fructose
corn syrup in the Jones mix.
200 Id. at 949 (majority opinion).
201 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
202 Silvermanv. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961).
203 316 U.S. 129
(1942).
204 Silverman, 365 U.S.
at 512.
205 Justice Douglas' concurrence indirectly supports this reading
of the case.
Anticipating Katz's approach, he would have characterized the invasions of privacy in
both Silverman and Goldman as Fourth Amendment searches because "the invasion of
privacy is as great in one case as in the other." Id. at 512 (Douglas, J., concurring). But,
given that the Court's view at the time was that the amendment protected property, the
majority opted for a different approach, presumably one that entailed characterizing the
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Claiming that "the concept of a 'seizure' of property is not much
discussed in our cases," Jacobsen adapted language the Court had used to
determine whether a person was seized-whether there was meaningful
interference with his freedom of movement-to invent its new
definition. 206 None of the cases it cited as direct authority for this
definition applied it. The only pre-Katz case, dated to 1906, dealt with a
challenge to a subpoena to produce corporate documents, and referred to a
seizure as ordinarily "contemplat[ing] a forcible dispossession of the
*
207
owner" in passing.
Any doubt that this definition of seizure substantially departed
from Silverman is dispelled by Justice Stevens' opinion in UnitedStates v.
Karo, a case decided just three months after Jacobsen. Relying on
Silverman, the author of the Jacobsen majority clarified that any
conversion of property to the government's use satisfies the "meaningful
interference" criterion. Joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, Justice
Stevens argued that the government's placing a tracking device inside a
container owned by the defendant was a Fourth Amendment seizure
because it deprived the owner of exclusive use of his property:
The attachment of the beeper, in my judgment, constituted
a "seizure." The owner of property, of course, has a right to
exclude from it all the world, including the Government,
and a concomitant right to use it exclusively for his own
purposes. When the Government attaches an electronic
monitoring device to that property, it infringes that
exclusionary right; in a fundamental sense it has converted
the property to its own use. Surely such an invasion is an
"interference" with possessory rights; the right to exclude,
which attached as soon as the can respondents purchased
was delivered, had been infringed. That interference is also
"meaningful"; the character of the property is profoundly

invasions more naturally as a seizure of the heating system.
206 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113
n.5.
207 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906).
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different when infected with an electronic bug than when it
is entirely germ free.2 08
Antoine Jones relied on the quoted passage from Justice Stevens'
Karo opinion to argue that attachment of the GPS tracking device was a
seizure of his Jeep. 209 Had anyone anticipated that the Court would decide
the case using a trespass test, Mr. Jones might have argued that requiring a
showing of "meaningful interference" makes no sense in a world where
the Fourth Amendment is understood to protect property rather than (or in
addition to) privacy. Instead, the parties naturally accepted that Jacobsen
redefined "seizure" to account for Katz's abandonment of property law in
Fourth Amendment adjudication. Thus, the government responded to Mr.
Jones' contention by explaining that the Karo Court rejected Justice
Stevens' reasoning on the ground "that placing the beeper in the can
amounted at most to a technical trespass, which was only 'marginally
relevant' to the Fourth Amendment inquiry. The same is true here." 2 10
Of course, once the Court decided that a trespass was (once again)
an event of constitutional significance, the government's concession that
installing a GPS device was a "technical" trespass should have been
dispositive. Karo assumed trespasses were only marginally relevant to the
Fourth Amendment analysis because at the time a trespass merely
informed the expectations-of-privacy inquiry. As soon as Jones held that
trespasses were independently significant, the government's own logic
should have lead inexorably to the conclusion that it had seized Mr. Jones'
Jeep.
The Court did not mention Mr. Jones' seizure argument, much less
explain why it was wrong. This is odd as it puts a tremendous strain on the
language to call what happened to Mr. Jones a "search". It is not at all
clear what "the place to be searched" 211 was in this case. Attaching the
tracking device to the Jeep did not "search" it in the sense of revealing
208

Karo, 468 U.S. at 729 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting

in part).
Brief for Respondent at 45-52, United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012)
(No. 10-1259).
21 0
Reply Brief for the United States at 18, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259).
211 U.S. CONST. amend.
IV.
209
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what was inside it. If anything was searched, it was the metropolitan area
around Washington, D.C., throughout which the government tracked the
Jeep's movements. It makes much more sense to say the Jeep was seized,
in the sense that the government "usurped" or converted the Jeep to its
own use.212 In other words, because the government interfered with Mr.
Jones' exclusive use of the Jeep, it seized it.213 This linguistic contortion
has one obvious effect. It preserves the results in cases like Miller,
Jacobsen, and Place that withdrew constitutional protection from personal
records and contraband.2 1 4 The holdings in those cases depended on the
assumption that the seizure test of Wong Sun, Silverman, and Berger did
not survive Katz. Jones' new trespass test provides a way to preserve the
outcomes in these decisions.
Jacobsen's "meaningful interference" requirement has no basis in
a jurisprudence that purports to be solicitous of property rights. A trespass
has never required a showing of harmful effect, and that is demonstrably
true of the trespasses that concerned the framers of the Fourth
Amendment. Entick v. Carrington, an eighteenth-century English case
universally agreed to be among the primary inspirations for the Fourth
Amendment,2 1 5 firmly declared that government agents must respect
property rights to the same degree as private actors:
212 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949 n.2 (noting that Mr. Jones' wife was the registered
owner of the Jeep, a fact to which the Court attached no consequence because, as an
authorized user, he effectively had the rights of an owner).
213 Common understanding regarding the extent of property rights is relevant to
understanding the scope of those rights. See 0. W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
214 In Miller, that would entail conceiving of the bank records as information
that, like a conversation, is capable of being seized. In Place, even the most fleeting
seizure of luggage for a dog to sniff it would be a seizure. In Jacobsen, the federal
agents' handling of a package entrusted to Federal Express for delivery would likewise
be a seizure. The "meaningful interference" concept allows courts to avoid what some
might view as undesirable implications of a property-based Fourth Amendment.
215 See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 32 (2005); TELFORD
TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 29-38 (1969); Akhil Reed
Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples, 107 HARv. L. REV. 757, 772-75 (1994);
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
411-12 (1974); Thomas K. Clancy, The FourthAmendment's Concept of
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No man can set his foot upon my ground without my
license, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be
nothing; which is proved by every declaration in trespass,
where the defendant is called upon to answer for bruising
the grass and even treading upon the soil. 2 16
This explains why, for example, Justice Scalia or Justice Alito would be
irked to find his car scratched, dinged, or otherwise minutely vandalized
and would not be much consoled by the car being just as functional as
before. Indeed, one might well be angered if someone else so much as spit
on his car. Having property means being able to exclude all other people
from it, even to the point of irrationality. "Liberty is more than the right to
do what the majority wants, or to do what is 'reasonable.' Liberty is the
right to defy the majority, and to do what is unreasonable." 2 17
Requiring a showing of harm before an unjustified government
intrusion is legally condemned is like arguing that only people who have
something to hide should complain about pervasive government
surveillance. This thinking encourages the proliferation of suspicionless,
general searches for contraband-precisely the sort of searches that
animated the Fourth Amendment in the first place. Before Katz, Silverman
made clear that any unauthorized "usurpation" of a person's property by
the government-even if it did not affect the use of that property at allviolated the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v. United States
concomitantly held that taking a person's bodily fluids for testing entailed
both a seizure and a search of that person.218 After Katz, the Court held
that forcing students to produce urine for drug testing, requiring travelers
to surrender their luggage to be sniffed by a dog, and stopping drivers to
conduct random searches were all constitutional without any

Reasonableness,2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 982-87 (2004); Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering
the OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 603-07 (1999); William J.
Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of CriminalProcedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396-97
(1995).
216 Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (K.B.).
217 Reich, supra note
42.
218 Schmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757,
767 (1966).
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particularized suspicion.219 In none of these cases did the courts attempt
to assign any weight to the value of unfettered exercise of constitutional
rights." 220
This is why the Fourth Amendment makes no sense unless it is
understood to protect all forms of property, including informational
property and contraband. Property is what creates space for dissenting
from controversial regulations-ranging from those suppressing political
activities to those enacting temperance crimes:
Property draws a circle around the activities of each private
individual or organization. Within that circle, the owner has
a greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he must
justify or explain his actions, and show his authority.
Within, he is master, and the state must explain and justify
any interference....
Thus, property performs the function of maintaining
independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating
zones within which the majority has to yield to the owner.
Whim, caprice, irrationality and "antisocial" activities are
given the protection of law; the owner may do what all or
most of his neighbors decry.22 1
Katz put many activities that had been within the circle of property's
protection outside of it.
Characterizing the attachment of a GPS device to Mr. Jones' Jeep
as a search rather than a seizure makes a difference in cases involving
government surveillance of documents or other data created by an
See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (holding
that "some brief detentions of personal effects" are constitutional without probable
cause); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); Mich. Dep't. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S 730, 739 (1983) (plurality
opinion) (stating that "routine" driver's license checkpoints are constitutional); Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55, 663 (1979) (suggesting that random driver's license
checkpoints would be constitutional under the Katz balancing test).
220 Reich, supra note 42 at 776.
219

22 1

Id. at 771.
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individual. This potentially means that emails and other documents stored
on remote computers are open to government copying and inspection
without restriction. Even if the information is deemed to be the author's
property, there is no meaningful interference with it if the government
merely copies it. And, because the information resides on a server that
does not belong to the author, the author has no standing to complain
about it. 222 Thus, the "meaningful interference" requirement works to
curtail the protection extended to intangible forms of property that could
plausibly be said to be owned by an individual targeted by the
government.
The view that a seizure requires "meaningful interference", for
example, leaves the federal, state, and local governments free to continue
tracking people by obtaining location data from mobile telephone carriers.
By the time Jones was decided, cellular telephone tracking without
judicial oversight was already widespread, involving thousands of
demands for data per day, and rapidly growing even more
commonplace.22 3 In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor agreed that Jones
did not necessarily say anything about tracking people through their own
electronic devices. "Owners of GPS-equipped cars and smartphones do
not contemplate that these devices will be used to enable covert
,,224
surveillance of their movements.
Even while endorsing the Katz test,
she asked whether Miller and Smith should be reconsidered to handle the
challenges to privacy posed by a digitalized world necessitating the
*
225
constant sharing of personal information.
Justice Sotomayor's notion
that this problem can be worked out within the Katz framework is simply
question begging. If the privacy-equals-secrecy holdings of Miller and
Compare Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92
(1920) (holding that government could not make use of copies of documents
unconstitutionally seized from defendant's office).
223 See Eric Lichtblau, Cell CarriersCalled on More in Surveillence,
N.Y.
TIMEs, July 9, 2012, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cellcarriers-see-uptick-in-requests-to-aid-surveillance.html?pagewanted=all; Lichtblau,
supra note 14.
224 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J.,
concurring).
222

22 5

Id. at 956.
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Smith were overruled, the Katz test would require some other definition of
privacy, and Justice Sotomayor proposed none. She disagreed with Justice
Alito's claim that societal expectations of privacy erode as information
becomes more public, but offered no criteria for distinguishing disclosures
that vitiate privacy from those that do not. Recognizing that the Fourth
Amendment protects informational property from unjustified seizure even
if there is no further "meaningful interference" with it solves the problem.
Cellular data tracking is not the only government tool to render the
Jones holding obsolete no sooner than it was handed down. Cameras
deployed throughout the country by state and municipal police scan
license plates at the rate of dozens per second to track the movements of
millions of people.2 26 They are fixed on roadways and attached to police
cruisers. 227 It is hard to argue with the idea "that a motorist has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained on his
license plate . . . 228 Consequently, the Katz framework forces those
concerned about such pervasive tracking techniques to argue that the
government's use of computers to agglomerate and manipulate data
implicates the Fourth Amendment. 229 (Jones echoes this argument in its
concern over the accumulation of GPS data.) Saying that the government
violates the Fourth Amendment by accessing data it lawfully collected
stretches the notion of "search" further than seems plausible. The problem,
if there is one, must inhere in how the data is collected.
IV. PRAGMATIC PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

The trespass test the Court had developed and reaffirmed in the
term before Katz is more faithful to the Fourth Amendment's aims and
Cyrus Farivar, Your Car, Tracked: The Rapid Rise ofLicense Plate
Readers,
ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 15, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/09/your-cartracked-the-rapid-rise-of-license-plate-readers.
226

227 Id.
228

United States v. Ellison, 462 F.3d 557, 561-63 (6th Cir. 2006) (collecting

229

See, e.g., id. at 567-68 (Moore, J., dissenting).

cases).
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would have averted, had it endured, many of the difficulties that Katz
introduced into the law. It recognized that a trespass or conversion is
complete despite there being no interference with an owner's use; that
property can be tangible or intangible; that sharing property does not
vitiate an owner's ability to preclude government inspection; and that a
strong government interest does not make an unjustified intrusion any less
of a trespass. Adopting this test today would resolve the shortcomings that
Jones' weaker trespass test perpetuates, but doing so might well mean that
the government cannot without suspicion have dogs sniff luggage230 or
cars 231 for drugs; force adolescents to produce urine for testing; 232 or stop
cars on the highway without individualized suspicion.2 3 3 The Katz
framework sanctions such invasions of privacy only because, by
trivializing the property interests involved, it subjugates unprivileged
individuals into ritual compliance with a false notion of the public interest.
"High-status people do not undergo drug testing. Lawyers, professors,
executives, judges, and other members of the professional and
administrative class are exempt from this calculated humiliation."234
Predicating the Fourth Amendment's protection on a pragmatic
understanding of property leads to more equal treatment.
The Supreme Court already enforces, as a matter of federal
common law, an understanding of property consistent with Silverman and
Berger in mail and wire fraud prosecutions, which generally require proof
of intent to deprive2 35 the victim of property.23 6 When interpreting federal
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
232 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia
Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
233 See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Mich.
Dep't of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
234 Reich, supra note 104,
at 1425.
235 This common formulation of fraud (or any form
of theft) is linguistically
rooted in a different type of "privacy" than Katz. To deprive means to de-privatize in the
sense of stripping the owner's exclusivity of use.
236 For present purposes, honest-services fraud can be set aside. See Cleveland v.
United States, 531 U.S. 12, 18-20 (2000) (every fraud charge must specify whether the
object was a property-deprivation fraud or an honest-services-deprivation fraud; thus the
230
231
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fraud statutes, the Court has had no difficulty recognizing deprivations of
property interests-despite arguments that there was no meaningful
interference, that the assets were merely intangible, and that the victim had
shared the information. The result is a coherent, logical, flexible
understanding of property that could readily be used in Fourth
Amendment cases, obviating any need to ever discuss privacy
expectations again.
In 1987, the Court unanimously rejected in Carpenter v. United
States two fraud defendants' claims that their convictions were invalid
because their actions did not interfere with the victim's use of the property
they allegedly stole. 2 37 A Wall Street Journal reporter who co-wrote
"Heard on the Street," a column reviewing stocks, partnered with some
stockbrokers to trade on information to be printed in the column.2 3 8 It did
not matter that the Journal was able to use the information exactly as it
would have in the absence of any scheme. In fact, the success of the
scheme depended on the Journal's doing so. If the Journal did not
proceed to publish the information, the defendants would not have profited
from their investments. In Jones, Justice Alito used that rationale to
conclude there was no seizure, reasoning that the government's
surveillance technique depended on Mr. Jones being able to use the Jeep
notwithstanding the tracking device.239 But the Carpenter Court rejected
it. What mattered was that the defendants did something with the
Journal's property that the Journal did not authorize: "[I]t is sufficient
that the Journal has been deprived of its right to exclusive use of the
information, for exclusivity is an important aspect of confidential business

information and most private property for that matter.", 240 In this same
fraud cases elaborating on what constitutes a property interest are unadulterated by the
cases discussing a deprivation of honest services).
237
238

484 U.S. 19 (1987).

Id. at 23.
239 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito,
J., concurring)
("Indeed, the surveillance technique that the officers employed was dependent on the fact
that the GPS did not interfere in any way with the operation of the vehicle, for if any such
interference had been detected, the device might have been discovered.").
240 Carpenter,484 U.S. at 26-27; see also id. at 26 ("The Journal
had a property
right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use, prior to publication, of the
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way, attaching a tracking device to someone's property deprives the owner

of the exclusive use of the property.
Carpenter also demonstrates that the idea, approved in Silverman,
Wong Sun, and Burger, that intangible information constitutes property
endures after Katz. The Carpenter defendants argued that their fraud
convictions could not stand because "the Journal's interest in
prepublication confidentiality for the 'Heard' columns is no more than an
intangible consideration . . . .,,241 Relying on 1918's InternationalNews
Service v. AssociatedPress (just as AT&T and Justice Butler advocated in
Olmstead), the Carpenter Court concluded that intangible information is
property: "Here, the object of the scheme was to take the Journal's
confidential business information-the publication schedule and contents
of the 'Heard' column-and its intangible nature does not make it any less
'property' protected by the mail and wire fraud statutes.",242
Carpenter'sview of property does not penalize one who shares his
property with another. Unlike in Miller and Smith, the Carpenter Court
did not suggest that the Journalassumed the risk that an employee would
divulge or use information acquired through his work. On the contrary, the

Court pointed out that "'even in the absence of a written contract, an
employee has a fiduciary obligation to protect confidential information
obtained during the course of his employment."' 24 3 The employment-atwill relationship hardly distinguishes Miller and Smith. The depositor in
Miller and the telephone customer in Smith had contractual agreements
with the bank and with the carrier respectively. No less than the Journal's
employee, these entities were obliged "to protect confidential information
obtained during the course" of performing their contractual duties.
This same idea-whether information, once shared, became
public-was a sticking point in Associated Press. But the Court then
recognized that some information is only valuable when it is shared: "The
schedule and contents of the 'Heard' column." (emphasis added)).
241
1d. at 25.
242

Id.; see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997)

(reaffirming Carpenteron this point).
243

Carpenter,484 U.S. at 27 (quoting Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 515

(1980) (per curiam)).
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peculiar value of news is in the spreading of it while it is fresh; and it is
evident that a valuable property interest in the news, as news, cannot be
maintained by keeping it secret." 244 The same is true, of course, of
instructions to the bank, telephone numbers dialed, web sites visited, and
nearly all the information that consumers share with corporations to
receive their services. There is no reason why the information the
Associated Press shares with its subscribers should be deemed property
while the information than an individual communicates to corporate
service providers should be held to be in the public domain.
Sharing information can result in its communication to the
government, of course, but that does not mean the government is entitled
to it. AT&T argued in Olmstead that participants to a conversation are
"co-owners" of it. The Court approved this notion at least implicitly in
Silverman, Wong Sun, Berger, and Katz. The idea that the intended
recipient of information becomes a co-owner of it means that the recipient
may divulge it voluntarily without implicating the Fourth Amendment.
This explains a line of cases decided in the years between Wong Sun and
Berger, holding that the government's use of false friends, undercover
agents, and informants to transmit or record conversations constituted
neither a search nor a seizure. 245 In each of those cases, the government
became a "co-owner" of information voluntarily communicated to it by a
defendant.2 4 6 That the defendant did not expect to have his confidence
betrayed or his words recorded did not implicate the Constitution. These
holdings survived Katz intact and, somewhat ironically, formed the basis
for Miller and Smith. (For a short time after Katz, the Court was equally
244

Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918).

OsbornV. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 327 (1966); Hoffa v. United
States,
385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 439 (1963).
246 Osborn, 385 U.S. at 327 (upholding "the use by one party of a device to
make an accurate recording of a conversation about which that party later testified");
Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210 ("During neither of his visits to petitioner's home did the agent
see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and in fact intended, by petitioner
as a necessary part of his illegal business."); Lopez, 373 U.S. at 438 ("The only evidence
obtained consisted of statements made by Lopez to Davis, statements which Lopez knew
full well could be used against him by Davis if he wished.").
245
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divided over the narrow question of whether Katz limited the use of
24
informants wired with transmitters.24
But, after Justices Black, Harlan,
and Douglas retired, the Court quietly adopted the view that it did not.24)
Another advantage of the pre-Katz property approach is that it
discourages judicial balancing of interests. Property rights are, compared
to privacy interests, well defined and, consequently, cannot be easily
overridden by platitudes about societal good. Thirteen years after
Carpenter, the Court concluded in Cleveland v. United StateS249 -again
unanimously-that a state license to operate computerized poker machines
was not property under the federal fraud statutes.250 The government
alleged that the petitioner schemed to obtain a gaming license, concealing
his participation because he would not have met Louisiana's moral and
fiscal integrity requirements. 2 51 Tracking Carpenter, the Court
distinguished the state's regulatory interest as sovereign in the licensing
scheme "from traditional concepts of property."2 5 2 The Louisiana
licensing scheme specified that a license "is not property or a protected
See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) (plurality opinion); id.
at 755 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 762-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 787-89
(Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 795-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Black, insisting
that Katz itself was fundamentally illegitimate, took no position on its implications. Id. at
754 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's dissent in White did the best job of
explaining why this might be so. A person might willingly risk voicing unpopular or
controversial views to someone he knows well, knowing the friend might betray him.
That risk becomes unacceptably high when the government can bribe or cajole a person's
close friends into becoming government agents. One is a world where people can't trust
others they don't know very well. The other is a world where people cannot afford to
trust anyone. Justice Harlan is self-consciously focused on what makes sense for our
political system and society. He is not asking what the defendant actually risked. He is
asking what the nation can afford to risk.
248 See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing White, 401 U.S.
at 751 (plurality opinion)); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 743 n.2 (1979)
(same).
249 531 U.S. 12 (2000).
250 Although there was a circuit split over whether a license
constitutes property
of which a state may be defrauded, the large majority of the circuits had concluded that it
did not. Id. at 17-18.
247

25 1
25 2

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 24.
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interest under the constitutions of either the United States or the state of
Louisiana."253 The Court, however, noted that the federal courts were not
bound by that declaration, stating, "the question whether a state-law right
constitutes 'property' or 'rights to property' is a matter of federal law." 2 54
The Court concluded that Louisiana's "sovereign right to exclude
applicants deemed unsuitable to run video poker operations" was not a
property interest under federal law.25 5
In the same way that whether an interest constitutes property in a
federal fraud case is a matter of federal common law, whether a tangible
or intangible thing constitutes a "paper" or an "effect" has been, since at
least the time of Olmstead, a matter of federal constitutional law. A
legislature's declaration that certain beverages, plants, chemicals, movies,
or books are contraband does not place them outside the Constitution's
protection, especially given that searches for seditious libels inspired
passage of the Fourth Amendment. The amendment protects even effects
whose possession Congress or a state legislature decides to outlaw.
Property law has long accommodated the idea that a person may have
legally cognizable interests in property despite a legal incapacity to
possess it. In one case, for example, the Seventh Circuit blocked the
federal government's attempt to confiscate and destroy a convicted felon's
firearms holding that the government had to sell, bail, or store the
weapons for him. 256 Because of this distinction between ownership rights
and possessory rights, there is no reason for treating contraband as outside
the Fourth Amendment's ambit and a good reason for not doing so: it
causes the proliferation of suspicionless dragnet searches.2 57
By focusing on exclusivity of dominion over private property,
including information obtained pursuant to a contract for services, the preId. at 25 n.4 (quoting La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27:301(D) (2000)).
d. (quoting Drye v. United States, 528 U.S. 49, 58 (1999)).
255
1d. at 24, 25 n.4 (quoting Drye, 528 U.S. at 58).
256 See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 588 F.3d 418,
420 (7th Cir. 2009)
253

25 4

1

("Because the United States did not commence a timely forfeiture proceeding, Miller's
property interest in the firearms continues even though his possessory interest has been
curtailed.").
257 See Bascuas, supra note 35, at 758-69 (describing
Operation Pipeline).
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Katz test facilitates resolution of issues that are needlessly convoluted
under Jones as well as Katz. Rather than musing wincingly in California
v. Greenwood2 58 about nocturnal foragers and dirty urchins getting into
garbage cans, the Court could have answered the real question: whether
garbage put at the curb is abandoned for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Colorable arguments might be made on either side, but courts are better
able to credibly determine when an individual's property rights in trash are
extinguished than when one's expectation that her trash is "private"
becomes unreasonable.
Justice Sotomayor's concern over cellular telephone tracking
would be easily assuaged. Mobile telephone users would have standing to
complain that the government converted their telephones into tracking
devices, trespassing (and thereby seizing) the devices by depriving the
owner of exclusive use of the phone and the information it generates. The
telephone, after all, reveals the user's location only incidentally to
achieving its function of putting the user in telephonic contact with others.
It is the user who pays for the telephone and the communications service.
Today's mobile phones and the information that flows from them are, for
Fourth Amendment purposes, no different from Silverman's heating pipes

and the conversations that echoed throughout them in 1958. Tapping the
phone to seize information is functionally indistinguishable from tapping
the pipes to seize conversations.
Similarly, viewed from Silverman's vantage, the problem with
license plate tracking is the license plate itself and the purpose it serves.
Requiring every driver to affix a license plate to a car as part of a vehicle
taxing scheme might not constitute a Fourth Amendment "seizure" any
more than requiring a building to have plumbing does. This is not because
the license plate does not "meaningful interfere" with the car's use.
Rather, it is because the reason why the government does something is
258

486 U.S. 35, 51 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The Court properly rejects

the State's attempt to distinguish trash searches from other searches on the theory that

trash is abandoned and therefore not entitled to an expectation of privacy."); see also
California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 320 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from dismissal of
writ of certiorari) ("Rooney's property interest, however, does not settle the matter for
Fourth Amendment purposes, for the reach of the Fourth Amendment is not determined
by state property law.").

The FourthAmendment in the InformationAge

2013]

536

often a critical question in determining whether the action is allowed or
prohibited. 259 The government can require plumbing as a health and safety
regulation, but it does not follow that it can then tap the pipes to overhear
conversations. In the same way, it does not follow from the government's
being able to require license plates to raise revenue that it can use them as
tracking devices without committing an unconstitutional conversion of
each automobile. 260 The Fourth Amendment may well require changes to
license plates to make tracking impossible or suppression of evidence
obtained through license-plate tracking even if requiring license plates for
a purpose other than tracking is permissible.
Had the Court abandoned expectations of privacy and relied
instead on property concepts, it would not have had to duck the critical
issues in City of Ontario v. Quon. Rather than having to divine whether
society expects text messages to be private, the Court could have
undertaken to decide whose property the messages were, just as it decided
in Carpenterthat the Journalowned the information its reporter gathered.
That is not to say that the question of ownership over text messages sent
on city equipment issued to police officers is free from all doubt. Its
resolution might have been influenced by the city's having acquiesced in
the police sergeant sending personal text messages so long as he
reimbursed the city for the cost.261 Rather, the point is that framing the
question with reference to property concepts rather than expectations of
privacy makes it possible for a court to answer it with authority.
See Jardines v. Florida, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416-17 (2013) ("Here,
however,
the question before the court is precisely whether the officer's conduct was an objectively
reasonable search. As we have described, that depends upon whether the officers had an
implied license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they
entered. Here, their behavior objectively reveals a purpose to conduct a search, which is
not what anyone would think he had license to do."); National Aero. & Space Admin. v.
Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 757 (2011) (holding that the government has greater latitude in
gathering personal information when it acts as an employer than when it acts as
sovereign).
260 Cf Reich, supra note 104, at 1428 ("Regulatory power over the right
to drive
is delegated by the people to the state for one purpose alone-to ensure safety on the
public highways. It is a manifest abuse for the state to use its licensing power for any
purpose whatsoever except to ensure safe driving.").
261 City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619,
2625-26 (2010).
259
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This is not to say that courts never have any trouble identifying
property interests.2 6 2 Appeals involving fraudulent schemes to obtain
unearned frequent-flier travel awards, for example, mistakenly have
focused on the question of whether frequent-flier miles are "property" of
the airline. 263 But that is not the actual issue. In United States v. Loney,
American Airlines was not defrauded out of frequent flier miles when the
defendant fraudulently obtained tickets and sold them. It was defrauded of
the value of the travel service it provides, whether that is measured as the
amount for which the defendant sold the tickets or as the full retail value
of the tickets. The miles probably are not property at all, but the Fifth
Circuit's alternative rationale-that the scheme deprived the airline of its
"lawful revenues"-is more or less correct.2 64 (There is a needless
discussion to the effect that proof of harm is not an element of federal
fraud, but there is no doubt that American was harmed because it flew at
least two passengers without being compensated. 26 5 ) United States v.
Schrier likewise erroneously focuses on whether airline miles are
property, but the late Judge Edward Dumbauld's brief concurring opinion
266
is on the money in concluding that issued tickets were property.
Whatever the difficulties entailed in identifying property interests as a
matter of federal common law, the process is a customary one for judges
and lawyers, while identifying expectations of privacy is not.
V. CONCLUSION

Olmstead, Katz, and Jones each presented the same basic problem:
how to meet the challenge to privacy posed by the technological advances
See, e.g., Jolly v. United States, 170 U.S. 402 (1898) (analyzing whether
unissued postage stamps have "intrinsic value" and are thus property of the United
States).
263 See, e.g., United States v. Loney, 959 F.2d 1332, 1335-36
(5th Cir. 1992)
(discussing Trans-World Airlines v. Am. Coupon Exch., 913 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1990)).
262

264

Id. at 1336.

26 5

Id. at 1337 n.13.
908 F.2d 645, 648 (10th Cir. 1990) (Dumbauld, J., concurring).
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of the Information Age. That challenge has not been met by the Court's
long experiment with protecting expectations of privacy directly. On the
contrary, the Katz test has been a dismal failure, yielding an arbitrary and
unpredictable jurisprudence that allowed the Court to withdraw the
amendment's protection over some traditional forms of property, like
contraband. The Katz framework is irremediable because, even assuming
that anyone can correctly gauge societal expectations of privacy, courts
have shown that they cannot. Jones fails to improve upon it because, like
Katz, it proceeds from a misguided assumption that minor conversions of
property are allowed even without any individualized suspicion.
Meeting the challenge to privacy in the Information Age requires
understanding "persons, houses, papers, and effects" in a way that is
grounded in law yet can evolve as quickly as surveillance and
communication technology. It means interpreting those terms in a way that
is consistent with our understanding of property across various fields of
law and is therefore principled and predictable. The federal courts'
interpretation of federal fraud statutes shows that courts are capable of
doing just that. Courts have for years successfully identified new forms of
property created by new forms of storing and transmitting data and new
ways of transacting business. The Supreme Court has protected
informational property against fraud, rejecting the rationales and
justifications it deploys to allow the government to infringe on property
rights. The federal courts can and should protect all property from
government incursions in the same way that they protect it from
fraudsters.
Understanding that the Fourth Amendment protects property is
unavailing unless it is also accepted that the amendment protects property
from even slight incursions. A government trespass or conversion of
property is not "reasonable" in a constitutional sense because a court
deems it minor or in society's interest. Conversions of private property are
reasonable only when they are justified by individualized suspicion
amounting to probable cause. Despite its pretensions, Jones fails to restore
the Fourth Amendment's protection of property because it adopts an
unduly narrow understanding of "seizure", one that excludes many
government conversions of property from the amendment's reach. This
perpetuates the abuses that Katz fostered-abuses of the very sort the
framers sought to curb. It encourages corporations to sell sensitive

539

VirginiaJournalof CriminalLaw

[Vol. 1:3

information to government agencies on an unprecedented scale and
encourages police to conduct dragnet searches for contraband. Over the
long run, this fuels the government's agglomeration of data to track
individuals' thoughts and movements while degrading them by demanding
urine from schoolchildren, stopping drivers at highway checkpoints, and
searching travelers' personal belongings on the basis of a dog's instinct.
As Silverman illustrates, a Fourth Amendment seizure is complete with
the government's slightest touching of private property.

